Staggered Boards and the Wealth of Shareholders: Evidence from Two Natural Experiments by Bebchuk, Lucian Arye et al.
Staggered Boards and the Wealth
of Shareholders: Evidence
from Two Natural Experiments
The Harvard community has made this
article openly available.  Please share  how
this access benefits you. Your story matters
Citation Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Charles C.Y. Wang, Staggered
Boards and the Wealth of Shareholders: Evidence from Two Natural
Experiments (Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series, No.
697, June 2011).
Published Version http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/
Bebchuk_et%20al_697.pdf
Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:30064394
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://
nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAA
  ISSN 1936-5349 (print)  
 ISSN 1936-5357 (online) 
 
 
HARVARD 
JOHN M. OLIN CENTER FOR LAW, ECONOMICS, AND BUSINESS 
 
 
 
 
STAGGERED BOARDS AND THE WEALTH OF SHAREHOLDERS:  
EVIDENCE FROM TWO NATURAL EXPERIMENTS 
 
L  and Charles C. Y. Wang 
 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper No. 697 
 
6/2011 
 
 
Harvard Law School 
Cambridge, MA  02138 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from: 
 
The Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series: 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/  
 
The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1706806 
 
This paper is also a discussion paper of the 
John M. Olin Center's Program on Corporate Governance 
           
                                  
Staggered Boards and the Wealth of Shareholders:  
Evidence from Two Natural Experiments  
Lucian A. Bebchuk,
*
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**
 and Charles C.Y. Wang
*** 
  Abstract: While staggered boards have been documented to be negatively correlated with 
firm valuation, such association might be due to staggered boards either bringing about lower 
firm value or merely reflecting the tendency of low-value firms to have staggered boards. In this 
paper, we use two natural experiments to shed light on the causality question. In particular, we 
focus on two recent court rulings, separated by several weeks, that affected in opposite directions 
the antitakeover force of staggered boards: (i) a ruling by the Delaware Chancery Court 
approving the legality of shareholder-adopted bylaws that weaken the antitakeover force of a 
staggered board by moving the company’s annual meeting up from later parts of the calendar 
year to January, and (ii) the subsequent decision by the Delaware Supreme Court to overturn the 
Chancery Court ruling and invalidate such bylaws.  
We find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the Chancery Court ruling increased 
the value of affected companies – namely, companies with a staggered board and an annual 
meeting in later parts of the calendar year – and that the Supreme Court ruling produced a 
reduction in the affected companies’ value. The identified effects were most pronounced for 
firms for which control contests are especially relevant due to relative underperformance, small 
firm size, high asset pledgibility, or high takeover intensity in their industry.  
Our findings have implications for the long-standing debate on staggered boards. The 
findings are consistent with the market’s viewing staggered boards as bringing about a reduction 
in firm value. Our findings are thus consistent with leading institutional investors’ policies in 
favor of board de-staggering, and with the view that the ongoing process of board de-staggering 
in public firms can be expected to enhance shareholder value.  
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1. Introduction 
 The existence of governance provisions that weaken shareholder rights and insulate 
directors from removal is now well known to be negatively correlated with firm value (Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick (2003)). This correlation is partly driven by the negative correlation between 
firm value and staggered board provisions, which prevent shareholders from removing a majority 
of directors in any given shareholder meeting (Bebchuk and Cohen (2005); Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell (2009)). It might be suggested, however, that such correlation does not imply causation, 
and that it might be fully driven by the tendency of firms with low value and weak performance 
to have entrenching provisions in general and staggered boards in particular. In this paper we 
seek to contribute to understanding the causality question by studying two natural experiments – 
two court rulings that affected the extent to which staggered boards can impede shareholders 
seeking to replace a majority of directors. We find evidence consistent with market participants’ 
viewing the antitakeover force of staggered boards as value-reducing.  
Our results have significant policy implications for the long-standing debate on staggered 
boards and for the struggle between institutional investors and companies over the subject. Over 
time, institutional investors have become increasingly opposed to staggered boards. While 
shareholders were willing to vote for adopting a staggered board during the 1980s, they have 
generally been unwilling to do so since the early 1990s and have been increasingly willing to 
support shareholder proposals to dismantle staggered boards. According to Georgeson 
Shareholder reports, the average percentage of votes cast in favor of proposals to de-stagger 
boards exceeded 65% in each of the five proxy seasons from 2006 through 2010. The Council of 
Institutional Investors,
1
 major institutional investors such as the American Funds, BlackRock, 
CalPERS, Fidelity, TIAA-CREF, and Vanguard,
2
 and the two leading proxy advisors ISS and 
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1
 See Council of Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance Policies, at p. 3.  
2
 See American Funds, Proxy Voting Procedures and Principles, p. 3; BlackRock, Proxy Voting 
Guidelines for U.S. Securities, at p. 6; California Public Employees Retirement System, Global Principles 
of Accountable Corporate Governance, p. 17; Fidelity Investments, Corporate Governance and Proxy 
Guidelines, p. 11; TIAA-CREF, Policy Statement on Corporate Governance, p. 31; Vanguard, 
Vanguard's proxy voting guidelines, p. 2.  
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Glass Lewis,
3
 all have policies favoring annual election of all directors and board de-staggering 
proposals.   
Facing such widespread shareholder opposition to staggered boards, many companies, 
especially large companies receiving the most attention from investors seeking governance 
improvements, have chosen during the past decade to eliminate staggered boards; according to 
FactSet Research Systems, the number of S&P 500 companies with staggered boards declined by 
more than 40% from 2000 to 2009. Many companies with staggered boards, however, continue 
to resist investor pressure to de-stagger, express strong opposition to proposals to de-stagger their 
board, and argue that staggered boards enhance rather than reduce shareholder value.
4
 At present, 
about half of the publicly traded companies in the over 3,000 public companies whose takeover 
defenses are tracked by FactSet Research Systems still have a staggered board. The stakes in the 
debate on staggered boards are thus large.  
We seek to contribute to understanding the effects of a staggered board. Causal 
identification is notoriously difficult in empirical work on corporate finance and corporate 
governance. We use a quasi-experimental research design, focusing on the effects of two not-
fully-anticipated court rulings. In particular, we focus on the Chancery Court and Supreme Court 
rulings on October 8, 2010 and November 23
rd
, 2010, respectively, in the takeover battle 
between Airgas Inc. (“Airgas”) and Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. (“Air Products”).  
The rulings focused on the permissibility of adopting a shareholder-adopted bylaw -- 
conceived in the course of the Airgas takeover battle – that moves up the date of the next 
calendar year’s annual meeting to January. Such a bylaw has the potential of shortening the 
tenure of directors and facilitating the process of replacing a majority of the company’s directors. 
For companies whose annual meetings ordinarily took place in later parts of the calendar year (as 
was the case with Airgas whose annual meetings have typically been held in August or 
September), permitting such bylaws would reduce the extent to which staggered boards can 
delay the replacement of a majority of directors and thus lower the impediments to a hostile 
takeover. Chancellor Chandler of the Delaware Chancery Court initially ruled that such bylaws 
                                                 
3
 RiskMetrics Group, 2010 U.S. Proxy Voting Guidelines Summary, p. 18.  
4
 For examples of statements of boards of directors in opposition to shareholder proposals in favor of 
board de-staggering brought to a vote in 2010 annual meetings, see the 2010 proxy statements of  
Abercrombie & Fitch Co., Bancorp South, Inc., and Hospitality Properties Trust.  
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may be used. Subsequently, however, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed and held such 
shareholder-adopted bylaws to be invalid.  
We examine the cross-section of stock returns surrounding the announcements of the 
rulings, focusing on the value of the companies affected by the above two rulings – companies 
with a staggered boards whose annual meeting has been taking place in later parts of the calendar 
year. We find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the value of these companies was 
increased by the first ruling, which validated the novel method for weakening the antitakeover 
force of companies’ staggered boards. We also find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that 
the second ruling, which invalidated this novel method, had a negative effect on the value of 
these companies that was of a similar magnitude to that of the first ruling’s (positive) effect. The 
initial increase in value, and the subsequent reduction, was especially pronounced for companies 
for which control contests are especially relevant due to relative underperformance, high asset 
pledgibility, small firm size, or high deal intensity in the industry. 
Overall, our findings are consistent with market participants’ expecting the weakening of 
the antitakeover effect of staggered boards to bring about an increase in firm value. These 
findings are thus consistent with the large support among institutional investors for proposals to 
repeal staggered boards. The findings are also consistent with the view that the continued de-
staggering of boards – an ongoing process that has been taking place over the past decade – can 
be expected to benefit shareholders. The identified abnormal positive returns accompanying the 
Chancery Court ruling, and the abnormal negative returns accompanying the Supreme Court 
ruling, are likely to understate the market’s estimate of the benefits of repealing staggered boards 
because (i) as will be discussed, the market ascribed a positive probability to each of the ruling 
before they were issued, and (ii) the bylaws that were the subject of the rulings would have 
weakened but not eliminated the antitakeover force of staggered boards in the companies 
affected by the rulings.  
Our work seeks to contribute to the existing body of empirical work on staggered boards. 
Focusing on a sample of hand-collected targets of hostile takeovers, Bebchuk, Coates, and 
Subramanian (2002a, 2002b) found that, among takeover targets, those with a staggered board 
are associated with lower gains to shareholders following the receipt of a tender offer. 
Examining the 1,500+ public firms in the IRRC dataset, Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) 
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subsequently documented that staggered boards are associated with lower firm valuation as 
proxied by Tobin’s Q. Subsequently, Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) found that firms with 
staggered boards are associated with value-decreasing acquisition decisions; and Faleye (2007) 
reported that staggered boards are associated with lower sensitivity of compensation to 
performance and lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. Bates, Becher and 
Lemmon (2008) reported that staggered boards have a positive correlation with higher takeover 
premiums, but this study also reports that staggered boards are associated with a lower likelihood 
of an acquisition, and confirms, consistent with earlier work, that staggered boards are overall 
associated with lower firm valuation. We seek to contribute to this body of work by using a 
quasi-experimental setting to study whether the identified correlation between staggered boards 
and lower firm value is at least partly driven by staggered boards bringing about a lower firm 
value.
5
 
Our study also builds on the event study literature using stock price reactions to study the 
wealth effects of regulatory changes, beginning with Schwert (1981) (see MacKinlay (1997) for 
a review of the application of event studies to economics and finance, and Bhagat and Romano 
(2002) for a survey of such applications in corporate law). We add to the work using e event 
studies to study the effects of governance arrangements.
6
 The challenges facing event studies of 
                                                 
5
  Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) explore the causality issue by using staggered boards in 1990 as an 
instrument, obtaining evidence consistent with the correlation between staggered boards and lower firm 
value being at least partly driven by staggered boards’ operating to reduce firm value. This evidence, 
however, is offered as being merely suggestive on the causality issue.    
We also wish to note the results of Guo, Kruse, and Nohel (2008), who find positive stock market 
reactions to announcements by companies on plans to de-stagger. While the results of Guo et al. are 
consistent with ours, it is difficult to draw causal inferences from their findings because management 
decisions to de-stagger are unlikely to be random, but rather may tend to be taken by managements that 
anticipate improvements in firm value that would make them less vulnerable to a control contest in any 
event, and may thus be a signal to the market about management’s positive inside assessment. An earlier 
paper by Bhagat and Jeffries (1991), using data from the 1980s during which antitakeover amendments 
often passed, studied the returns accompanying the announcement of such amendments (in general, not 
only resulting in a staggered board).  
6
 For example, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) and Hochberg, Sapienza, and Vissing-Jorgensen 
(2009) use stock returns to study the effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; and Larcker, Ornazabal, and 
Taylor (2010) and Becker, Bergstresser, and Subramanian (2010) analyze stock returns to study the 
expected effects of proxy access reform.  
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governance changes are now well-understood: event studies focusing on governance changes 
adopted by companies bundle together the market’s assessment of the changes with the market’s 
inferences concerning the private information that might have led management to make such 
changes (see, e.g., Binder (1985), Coates (2000)); and events focusing on legislative adoption of 
new arrangements (e.g., Karpoff and Malatesta (1989)) might face the difficulty that market 
participants might at the time of adoption not have accumulated yet have experience with the 
consequences of the newly adopted arrangements; . The pair of rulings on which the current 
study focuses provides a good quasi-experimental setting: it involves exogenous changes that 
took place at clear points in time and were not fully anticipated prior to that point in time; the 
changes were to an arrangement – staggered boards – with whose consequences market 
participants have had a great deal of experience over the preceding two decades; and we are 
assisted by the fact that we have two events, each affecting the same set of companies but in the 
opposite direction than the other.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant 
institutional background, including the Delaware Chancery and Supreme Court rulings which are 
the focus of our study. Section 3 describes our data and provides summary statistics. Section 4 
shows that the stock returns accompanying the two rulings are consistent with the market’s 
viewing staggered boards as bringing about a lower firm value. Section 5 concludes.    
 
2. Staggered Board and the Airgas Ruling  
 
2.1. Staggered Boards 
A company may have a unitary or a staggered board. In a unitary board structure, all 
directors stand for election at each annual meeting. By contrast, in a staggered board structure, 
directors are grouped into separate classes, typically three classes, with only one of the classes 
coming up for re-election at each shareholder annual meeting. A staggered board structure 
therefore provides incumbent directors with substantial protection from attempts to gain control 
via either a proxy fight or a takeover bid.  
In a proxy fight over a company with a staggered board, a challenger would not be able to 
gain control of the board in one annual meeting but would need to win a shareholder vote in two 
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consecutive shareholder meetings. Thus, even a competing team that is viewed as superior by 
shareholders would face a substantial delay in its attempt to gain control. Furthermore, the 
prospect of a board that is bitterly split in the period between the two shareholder meetings might 
discourage some shareholders from voting for a challenger they would support if a clean-cut 
transition were possible.  
Staggered boards also provide substantial protection against hostile bidders because, 
following the development of the poison pill, a hostile bidder can prevail over incumbent 
opposition only by getting shareholders to replace the majority of the incumbent directors. U.S. 
law has developed during the 1980s and early 1990s to allow incumbents to adopt and maintain 
poison pill plans that, as long as they are in place, make it prohibitively expensive for a bidder to 
purchase a large block. As a result, the only route left for hostile bidders is to put an attractive 
offer on the table and persuade shareholders to replace the incumbents with a slate of directors 
receptive to the acquisition bid, typically nominated by the bidder itself. Once elected, such a 
slate of directors would redeem the poison pill and make the acquisition possible.  
Thus, a hostile takeover requires a ballot box replacement of a majority of directors and is 
hence made more difficult by the presence of a staggered board. With a staggered board, no 
matter how attractive a bidder’s offer is, the bidder would have to win in two consecutive annual 
meetings. In fact, the evidence indicates that takeover targets are substantially more likely to be 
able to fend off a hostile takeover bid and remain independent when their board is staggered 
(Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian 2002). 
  
2.2. The Airgas Bylaw  
 The takeover battle that has led to the ruling on which we focus has been waged for over 
a year, and a good account of it can be obtained from a series of Deal Professor columns written 
for the New York Times online by Professor Steven Davidoff.
7
 The saga began in October 2009, 
                                                 
7
  See Davidoff, “The Way Forward for Airgas,” New York Times online, March 19, 2010;  Davidoff, 
“The Air Products-Airgas Battle Heats Up,” New York Times online, May 14, 2010; Davidoff, “Airgas 
Rolls the Dice in Proxy Fight,” New York Times online, August 30, 2010; Davidoff, “Airgas’s Novel 
Question,” New York Times online, September 1, 2010; Davidoff, “After Losing Vote, What’s Next for 
Airgas?,” New York Times online, September 16, 2010; Davidoff, “Air Products Wins Round in Battle 
With Airgas,” New York Times online, October 8, 2010; Davidoff, “The Dwindling Options for Airgas,” 
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when Air Products expressed an interest in acquiring Airgas. Air Products made three offers 
over the following four months, which were all rejected by Airgas’ board of directors. In 
February of 2010, Airgas rejected Air Products’ $5 billion, all-cash tender offer to acquire 100% 
of Airgas’ shares.8 
Facing the opposition of the Airgas board, Air Products proceeded to a proxy fight at the 
shareholder meeting of Airgas in September 2010. Because Airgas has a staggered board, only 
one-third of its nine directors came up for re-election at the meeting. With a majority of Airgas’ 
shareholders seemingly supportive of its acquisition attempt, Air Products was able to replace 
the directors coming up for re-election with three individuals nominated by Air Products. 
In past calendar years, Airgas held its annual meetings no earlier than August, and thus, 
in the ordinary course of events, Air Products would have been expected to have to wait a year to 
get an opportunity to replace another one-third of Airgas’ directors and pave the way for an 
acquisition. In this case, however, Air Products made a novel move, which seems to have been 
first suggested in one of the Professor Davidoff’s Deal Professor columns.9 At the September 
2010 annual meeting, Air Products obtained majority shareholder approval for a new 
shareholder-adopted bylaw provision (“the Airgas Bylaw”), which specified that the next annual 
meeting will be held on January 18, 2011, a mere four months after the September 2010 annual 
meeting. 
Airgas turned to the Delaware Chancery Court, seeking to invalidate the bylaw. Airgas 
argued that the staggered board structure established in Airgas’ charter is inconsistent with the 
shortening of the directors’ terms that the bylaw would have produced, and that the bylaw is thus 
impermissible as contrary to the charter. Airgas warned that interpreting the standard language 
used in its charter as permitting shareholders to adopt bylaws such as the Airgas bylaw would 
dilute the significance of having a staggered board in many companies. In response, Air Products 
argued that the charter provision establishing a staggered board should be interpreted as 
                                                                                                                                                             
New York Times online, October 11, 2010. Davidoff, “Airgas’s Strategic Blink,” NY Times online, 
October 28, 2010. 
8
 On February 11, Air Products announced an all-cash tender offer at that price for 100% of the Airgas 
shares for $60/share, which was again rejected by Airgas. Air Products continued to raise its bid over the 
next few months, all met with a cool rejection: on July 8, it increased its offer to $63.50/share; and on 
September 6, 2010, it again raised its bid to $65.50/share.  
9
 See Steven M. Davidoff, “The Way Forward for Airgas,” New York Times online, March 19, 2010. 
8 
 
requiring only that one-third of the directors come up for election in each calendar year’s annual 
meeting, without limiting the ability of bylaws to specify the time during the calendar year in 
which the annual meeting will take place.  
The litigation attracted significant attention because of its implications for other publicly 
traded companies – namely, other companies with a staggered boards and an annual meeting 
ordinarily taking place in later parts of the calendar year.
10
 To the extent that bylaws such as the 
Airgas bylaw are permitted, the antitakeover force of these companies’ staggered boards would 
be weakened, as shareholders favoring a premium offer blocked by incumbent directors would 
be able to pass such a bylaw and shorten the delay required for replacing a majority of the board. 
Following the Chancery Court ruling permitting such bylaws, the Deal Professor column stated 
that the opinion “blows a hole in the defenses of many companies with staggered boards” and 
that these companies “will have to live with the fact that a staggered board can be weakened by 
forcing a subsequent annual meeting to occur much sooner than people thought.” Conversely, to 
the extent that such bylaws are impermissible, as the Delaware Supreme Court ultimately held, 
the antitakeover force of these companies’ staggered boards will remain intact and the “hole in 
the defenses” will be filled.11   
 
2.3. The October 8
th
 Chancery Court Ruling  
As is common in the courts of Delaware, the litigation over the permissibility of the 
Airgas bylaw proceeded quickly, with a final hearing taking place in the Delaware Court of 
Chancery on Friday October 8
th
, 2010. That evening, after the close of the stock market, 
Chancellor Chandler issued an opinion that sided with Air Products and approved the legality of 
the Airgas bylaw.
12
 Chandler concluded that the question of whether the Airgas bylaw is 
                                                 
10
 At the time of the Airgas rulings, companies’ ordinary timing of the annual meeting within the calendar 
year did not seem to reflect companies’ setting of the level of antitakeover protection. As noted earlier, 
the use of an Airgas-type bylaw in the context of a takeover battle was a novel technique first conceived 
for and tried in the Airgas 2010 takeover saga. Prior to this battle, the choice of the annual meeting timing 
was generally not viewed as relevant for corporate control purposes, and was made on the basis of various 
historical and logistical considerations.  
11
 See Steven M. Davidoff, “Air Products Wins Round in Battle with Airgas,” New York Times online, 
October 8, 2010.  
12
 Airgas, Inc. v. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., Chancery Court opinion, Decided October 8, 2010.  
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permissible is not unambiguously answered by studying the language of the charter provision 
establishing the staggered board, and that this ambiguity should be resolved by reference to a 
presumption in favor of the shareholder franchise.  
Chancellor Chandler’s ruling was not a complete surprise to the market. For instance, the 
widely followed Deal Professor column as well as the M&A Law Prof blog argued prior to the 
ruling that such an outcome was warranted on the merits and thus could well be expected.
13
 
While Chancellor Chandler’s ruling was not a complete surprise, however, it was not fully 
anticipated by the market either. In fact, at the time of the hearing in the Chancery Court on 
Friday, October 8, there was a downward movement in the stock price of Airgas, which a Deal 
Professor column covering the hearing attributed to market participants updating upwards the 
likelihood of an Airgas victory in light of certain remarks made by the Chancellor.
14
 
Furthermore, that the ruling was not fully anticipated by the market is suggested by the 
immediate post-ruling change in Airgas’ stock price. Airgas stock price rose by 2.7% at the very 
beginning of the first trading day (October 11, 2010) after the ruling was announced on the 
preceding Friday evening.
15
  
The not-fully-anticipated nature of Chancellor Chandler’s ruling gives rise to a natural 
experimental setting. The ruling was expected, to the extent that it would not be overturned on 
appeal, to weaken the insulating power of staggered boards of those companies whose annual 
meetings ordinarily takes place in later parts of the calendar year. Thus, a finding that the ruling 
was accompanied by positive abnormal returns to such companies (relative to non-impacted 
companies) would be consistent with the market’s viewing the antitakeover force of staggered 
boards as value-decreasing.  
 
 
                                                 
13
 See Davidoff, “Airgas’s Novel Question,” New York Times, September 1, 2010.  
Davidoff, “After Losing Vote, What’s Next for Airgas?,” New York Times online, September 16, 2010; 
Brian JM Quinn, “Advantage: Air Products,” M&A Law Prof Blog, October 8, 2010.  
14
  See Davidoff, “The Dwindling Options for Airgas,” New York Times online, October 11, 2010. 
15
 The view that the Chancery Court ruling was uncertain prior to its announcement – that is, that the 
ruling announced was neither a complete surprise nor fully anticipated – was also confirmed in 
conversations we had with market participants involved in the Airgas litigation and in M&A arbitrage 
trading in Airgas stock during the relevant period.  
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2.4. The November 23
rd
 Supreme Court Ruling 
After the initial Chancery Court decision, Airgas appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Delaware, which held a hearing over the case on November 2
nd
. Although the Delaware Supreme 
Court was expected to announce its decision within days of the hearings, as was commonly the 
case in Delaware Supreme Court rulings in fast-paced takeover battles, the Supreme Court 
announced its decision only three weeks later, on November 23, 2010.
16
  
Instead of focusing on the language of the standard charter provision establishing a 
staggered board, as did the Chancery Court, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the charter 
provision relied substantially on “extrinsic evidence,” such as the description of the chapter 
provision by commentators and in company disclosures. The Supreme Court concluded that the 
standard language of the staggered board provisions should be understood to require that 
directors serve for three years and thus to preclude Airgas-type bylaws that shorten this term 
significantly by moving up the annual meeting to the beginning of the calendar year. The 
Supreme Court ruling thus closed the door – opened up by the Chancery Court ruling – for using 
Airgas-type bylaws to weaken the force of the staggered boards of companies whose annual 
meeting ordinarily takes place in later parts of the year.  
As was the case with the Chancery Court ruling, the Supreme Court ruling was not 
completely unexpected. During the November 8, 2010 hearing at the Delaware Supreme Court, 
the Supreme Court Justices directed tough questions to Air Products’ counsel which led some 
market participants to raise their estimate of the likelihood of the Supreme Court’s reversing the 
lower court ruling.
17
 Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s delay in announcing a decision was 
viewed by market participants as increasing the likelihood of the Supreme Court’s finding the 
Airgas bylaw to be invalid; had the Court planned to validate the bylaw and thus pave the way 
for a shareholder meeting in two months, the Court would have had strong reason to try to 
announce its decision quickly to facilitate preparing for the resulting January 2011 meeting.  
                                                 
16
 Airgas, Inc. v. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., Delaware Supreme Court opinion, Decided November 
23, 2010, C.A. No. 5817.  
17
 See, e.g., Davidoff, “Staggered Boards and Company Value”, New York Times online, November 12, 
2010 (stating that “the questioning of the justices makes me ever so slightly more inclined to see the 
possibility of a reversal”).  
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As was the case with the Chancery Court ruling, however, the Supreme Court ruling was 
not fully anticipated by the market. Although Professor Davidoff revised the likelihood of 
reversal afterwards in light of the justices’ questioning at the Supreme Court hearing, his Deal 
Professor column continued to predict that the Supreme Court would likely affirm the lower 
court’s ruling.18 Furthermore, the stock price of Airgas fell significantly upon the announcement 
of the Supreme Court’s opinion at 1:30PM on November 23rd,19 which is consistent with the 
market not being certain that Airgas would win prior to the issuance of the decision.
20
   
The not-fully-anticipated nature of the Supreme Court ruling provides us with another 
good natural experiment setting for studying market participants’ view on how staggered boards 
affect firm value. By overturning the lower court ruling that weakened the insulating power of 
staggered boards of companies whose annual meetings ordinarily takes place in later parts of the 
calendar year, the Supreme Court ruling returned this insulating power of the companies’ 
staggered boards to pre-Airgas levels. Thus, a finding that the ruling was accompanied by 
negative abnormal returns to such companies (compared to non-impacted ones) would be 
consistent with the market’s viewing the power of staggered boards to delay director replacement 
by shareholders as value-decreasing.  
 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
We gather data on corporate governance characteristics, in particular the presence of a 
staggered board, from the Shark Repellent dataset of FactSet Research Systems. The data is 
                                                 
18
 See Davidoff, “Airgas’s Strategic Blink”, New York Times online, October 28, 2010.  
19
 It should be noted, however, that the decline in Airgas’ stock price was due both to the Supreme Court 
ruling that the Airgas bylaw is invalid and to the comments in the Supreme Court’s opinion, that signaled 
acceptance of the blocking of Air Product’s’ bid by Airgas’ directors. These comments could have 
reduced the market’s estimate of the likelihood that the litigation ongoing at the time over whether 
Airgas’ directors should be required to put out the poison pill would result in such an outcome.     
20
 As was the case with the Chancery Court ruling, the view that the Supreme Court ruling was uncertain 
prior to its announcement – that is, that the ruling announced was neither a complete surprise nor fully 
anticipated – was also confirmed in conversations we had with market participants involved in the Airgas 
litigation and in M&A arbitrage trading in Airgas stock during the relevant period.   
12 
 
available on a cross-section of U.S. based firms listed on NYSE, NYSE AMEX, NYSE ARCA, 
NASDAQ, or NASDAQ Capital Market.
21
  
We merge in data on stock prices and returns. In particular, we obtain October and 
November 2010 stock prices and returns from Datastream, and PERMNO identifiers and 
historical returns from CRSP.  
Finally, we obtain GVKEY identifiers, GICS industry classification, and most recently 
available annual financial statement information from Compustat. Throughout the paper we use 
6-digit GICS industry classification, which has been shown to better explain stock return co-
movements and cross-sectional variation in key financial ratios such as valuation multiples (see, 
e.g., Bhojraj, Lee, and Oler (2003)), and therefore provides a better classification system to form 
industry comparison groups. However, using the Fama-French 48 industry definitions does not 
significantly change our results.  
The intersection of the above four datasets provides a sample of 3,216 firms. For our 
empirical analysis, we follow the governance literature (see GIM (2003)) and exclude all dual-
class firms and real estate investment trusts (REITS) since they operate under unique corporate 
governance arrangements.
 22
 We also exclude all firms in which insider equity ownership 
exceeds 50% for which the possibility of a control contest is irrelevant regardless of whether the 
board is staggered; keeping these observations in the dataset does not qualitatively change our 
results. Our final sample consists of 2,633 firms.  
 Table I reports summary statistics for our primary variables of interest on our sample of 
firms, and for the subset of firms with and without a staggered board. As the Table indicates, our 
sample is roughly evenly split between firms with a staggered board (47%) and firms without a 
staggered board (53%). Firms with and without a staggered board are similar in terms of the 
month in which the last annual meeting took place; the median meeting month for firms with   
and without a staggered board is the fifth month of May, and the standard deviation of the 
meeting month variable is 2.0 and 2.2 for firms with and without a staggered board, respectively.  
                                                 
21
 Shark Repellent data current as of October 12, 2010. 
22
 REITs are defined as any firms with 4-digit SIC code of 6798. 
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Table I also provides summary statistics concerning the distribution of characteristics that 
could make control contests more relevant for a firm: Return on Assets (ROA)
 23 
and Tobin’s 
Q,
24
  which reflect a company’s performance;  PP&E to Total Assets Ratio25  and Cash to Total 
Assets Ratio,
26
 which reflect the extent to which the firm’s assets can be easily pledged and thus 
the ease with which a takeover could be financed; market capitalization,
27
 as small firms are 
known to be more likely to be acquired (see, e.g., Bats, Becher, and Lemmon (2008) and 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang (2010)); and industry takeover intensity.
28
 With the exception of 
market capitalization and takeover intensity, each of the above variables are industry-median 
adjusted; that is, we subtract for each firm-year observation the respective variable’s 6-digit 
GICS industry median value from the same fiscal year. Compared with companies with a 
staggered board, companies without a staggered board have a somewhat higher median industry-
adjusted Tobin’s Q, median industry-adjusted return on assets, median takeover intensity, and 
median market capitalization, somewhat lower industry-adjusted cash to assets ratio, and similar 
median industry-adjusted PP&E to assets ratios. In both types of companies, however, there is a 
substantial variation in each of these six variables.   
 
4. Announcement Returns around the Two Court Rulings 
 
4.1       The Treatment Group  
In our natural experiment setup, the firms that are meaningfully affected by the Chancery 
Court ruling (as well as its subsequent reversal by the Delaware Supreme Court) – that is, our 
“treatment group” – are firms that, like Airgas itself, have a staggered board and have their 
                                                 
23
 Return on assets is defined as operating income divided by book value of assets from end of previous 
fiscal year.  
24
 Following prior work, we use the definition of Tobin’s Q in Kaplan and Zingales (1997), who define 
Tobin’s Q as the market value of assets plus the market value of common stock less the sum of book 
value of common stock and balance sheet deferred taxes divided by the book value of assets. 
25
 PP&E to Total Assets Ratio is defined as the ratio of plant, property, and equipment to total assets. 
26
 Cash to Total Assets Ratio is defined as the ratio of total cash to total assets. 
27
 Market capitalization is taken from the most recently available annual financial statements in 
Compustat. 
28
 Industry takeover intensity is defined as the percentage of firms in the 4-digit GICS industry that were 
taken over in calendar year 2009.  
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annual meeting take place at later parts of the calendar year. We denote firms as belonging to the 
Treated-I group if they have a staggered board and their last annual meeting took place in June 
or a later month in the calendar year.
29
 We extend our analysis in Section 4.4 by examining 
alternative specifications with a cut-off month other than June. 
We also examine groups of firms that can be hypothesized to be especially affected by 
the rulings because they satisfy one or more dimensions that make a control contest (and the 
magnitude of impediment to them) especially relevant. We define four dimensions that increase a 
firm’s exposure to control contests: underperformance (up), high asset pledgibility (pl), small 
size (sm), and high industry takeover intensity (ti), and define the following four groups of 
“treated” firms:   
 the Treated-II-up group – firms that are in the Treated-I group and have  either a 
ROA below the industry median or a Tobin’s Q below the industry median;  
 the Treated-II-pl group – firms that are in the Treated-I group and have either a cash 
to total assets ratio above the industry median or a PP&E to total assets ratio above 
the industry median; 
 the Treated-II-sm group – firms that are in the Treated-I group and have a market 
capitalization below our sample’s median; and  
 the Treated-II-ti group – firms that are in the Treated-I group and belong to an 
industry with above median takeover intensity, defined as the percentage of firms in 
the 4-digit GICS industry that were acquired in 2009.  
The Treated-II-up, Treated-II-pl, Treated-II-sm, and Treated-II-ti groups consist of 
subsets of Treated-I that each captures one of the four dimensions making a control contest more 
relevant. In addition, we define another treatment group composed of firms that are potentially 
most affected:  
 the Treated-III group – firms that are in the Treated-I group and satisfy at least two of 
the four dimensions that magnify the relevance of control contests; in other words, the 
                                                 
29
 We choose June since it represents the upper half of our sample – the sample median meeting month is 
May. In Section 4.6 we test for the sensitivity of our primary results to changes to this meeting month 
cutoff.  
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Treated-III group consists of firms that are in the Treated-I group and in at least two 
of the four Treated-II groups defined above. 
 
4.2. Announcement Returns and the Court Rulings 
We begin by studying the stock market returns experienced by affected firms during one-
day and two-day windows following the announcements of the Chancery Court and the Supreme 
Court rulings. The Chancery Court ruling took place after the close of the stock market on 
Friday, October 8, 2010, and the first trading day following the ruling is thus Monday, October 
11
th
, which was Columbus Day. Because trading volumes on Columbus Day are lower than 
usual,
30
 and because most of the substantive, in-depth media discussion of the Chancery Court 
ruling came out only on Monday, October 11 and Tuesday, October 12,
31
 our primary focus will 
be on the two trading-day window ending at the close of the market on October 12
th
.   Unlike the 
Chancery Court ruling, the Supreme Court’s opinion was released during market trading hours, 
at 1:30PM on November 23
rd
. Given the short two-and-a half-hour window on the first trading 
day, we again focus primarily on  the two-day trading window from the close of November 22
nd
 
to the close of November 24
th
, but we also report results based on the one-day trading window 
from the close of November 22
nd
 to the close of November 23
rd
.   
We focus on risk-adjusted excess returns as dependent variables to account for the 
possibility that differences in raw returns between groups of firms may reflect differences in risk 
characteristics. Following standard procedures, risk-adjusted excess returns are computed in two 
steps as follows. First, each firm’s loadings on the Fama-French (1993) three factors and the 
Fama-French (1996) UMD momentum factor are estimated using the most recently available 120 
                                                 
30
 In the case of Columbus Day 2010, for example, the total dollar trading volume was 80% and 81.6% of 
the previous and the next trading day’s total dollar trading volumes, respectively, and 79.3% and 75.8% 
of the two succeeding Mondays’ total dollar trading volumes.  
31
 See Amon, “Foreclosure Suits, BP, Airgas, UBS in Court News,” Bloomberg, October 11, 2010; 
Gallardo, “Important Chancery Court Opinion for Corporations with Staggered Boards,” HLS Corporate 
Governance Blog, October 11, 2010; Kelly, “Update: Airgas to Fight Court Ruling Over Annual 
Meeting,” CNBC, October 11, 2010; McCarty and Kaskey, “Airgas to Appeal Delaware Ruling on 
Meeting Date in Air Products Dispute,” Bloomberg, October 11, 2010; Quinn, “Airgas to Appeal,” M & A 
Law Prof Blog, October 11, 2010; Davidoff,  “The Dwindling Options for Airgas,” New York Times 
online, October 12, 2010; McCarty and Kaskey, “Airgas to appeal ruling on meeting,” Philadelphia 
Inquirer, October 12, 2010. 
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trading days’ data ending on or prior to September 31th of 2010. That is, for each firm we obtain 
                             from the time-series regression:  
 
                                                          (1) 
 
We then obtain excess announcement window returns by taking the residuals from a cross-
sectional regression of raw announcement window returns on the estimated factor sensitivities. 
That is, for each firm, we obtain the fitted residual     from the cross-sectional regression:   
 
                                                             (2) 
 
We integrate the two events in our announcement returns analysis by pooling the 
observations from both events. Such an analysis has the advantage of increasing the sample size. 
It also enables testing hypotheses concerning the differences in magnitudes between the 
treatment effects of the two events.  
An earlier work that pools events is that of Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2010). They 
study several events related to proxy access reform, with some operating to increase the 
likelihood of such a reform and some operating to reduce the likelihood of such a reform. Their 
analysis assumes that all the events had an effect of similar magnitude, though some with the 
opposite sign to others. In our initial analysis, we follow the approach of Larcker et al (2010) and 
makes the assumption that the Supreme Court decision, which overturned the Chancery Court 
ruling, was accompanied by announcement returns of similar magnitudes but of opposite sign to 
those of the Chancery Court ruling. We later on (Section 4.3) conduct an analysis without 
making this assumption and obtain results consistent with the two events having consequences of 
same magnitude but opposite signs.  
Given the assumption used in this section that the events’ consequences are of the same 
magnitude but opposite signs, we multiply the excess returns from the second ruling by negative 
one. We test for differences in announcement window returns between treated and non-treated 
firms in Table II by regressing the adjusted one- and two-day excess returns on each of the six 
treatment group indicators: Treated-I, Treated-II-up, Treated-II-pl, Treated-II-sm, Treated-II-ti, 
and Treated-III. In each specification we include an indicator for the second ruling date, Event-2, 
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to account for possible differences in the mean returns between the two event dates. Panel A of 
Table II reports specifications estimated without 6-digit GICS industry fixed effects, and Panel B 
of Table II reports specifications with such fixed effects. All standard errors are clustered at the 
6-digit GICS industry level.  
In both Panels A and Panel B of Table II, we find strong evidence, particular with the 
two-day return window, that validating the Airgas bylaw and weakening the antitakeover force 
of staggered boards provides significantly positive returns for treated firms compared to non-
treated firms. Over the two-day event window, we find that Treated-I firms on average 
outperformed non-treated firms by 48.3 basis points in the specification without fixed effects and 
by 44.5 basis points in the specification with fixed effects; both coefficients are significant at the 
1% level.  
Consistent with the rulings’ impact depending on the presence of firm or industry 
characteristics that make control contests more relevant, the difference in the mean excess 
returns tends to be higher for the treated groups Treated-II-np, Treated-II-pl, Treated-II-sm, and 
Treated-II-ti than for the Treated-I group. Over the two day window, the treated groups Treated-
II-np, Treated-II-pl, Treated-II-sm, and Treated-II-ti outperformed non-treated firms by 
38.4~89.4 basis points when industry fixed effects are not included, and by 30.1~87.5 basis 
points when industry fixed effect are included. In six of eight specifications, the differences are 
statistically significant at the 1% level, and in all eight specifications the differences are 
statistically significant at the 10% (or lower) level.  
The results are most pronounced, as hypothesized, for the Treated-III group of most 
affected firms. In the two-day trading window, firms in the Treated-III group outperformed non-
treated firms by 83.3 basis points in the specification without industry fixed effects, and by 80.4 
basis points in the specification with industry fixed effects, with the results being statistically 
significant at the 1% level in both specifications.  
We note that any differences in mean announcement returns between the treated firms 
and the non-treated firms may be potentially attenuated by two factors: first, the extent to which 
the Chancery and Supreme Court rulings were viewed by the market as possible prior to the 
decisions; and, second, the extent to which the Chancery Court ruling was expected by the 
market to be reversed by the Delaware Supreme Court. Thus, whereas the identified positive 
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returns to treated firm are significant, they are likely to understate the market’s estimate of the 
value to treated firm of permitting Airgas-type bylaws. Furthermore, note that permitting Airgas-
type bylaws would have merely weakened rather than eliminated the antitakeover force of 
staggered boards: permitting such bylaws would have enabled shareholders to decrease, not 
eliminate, the extent to which staggered boards can delay the replacement of a majority of 
directors sought by a shareholder majority. Thus, whereas our results understate the market’s 
estimate of the value to treated firms of permitting Airgas-type bylaws, this estimate in turn is 
likely to be lower than the market’s estimate of the value of eliminating board classification.  
 
4.3 Announcement Returns and the Court Rulings – Differential Magnitudes 
In this section, we allow for the possibility that that the Supreme Court’s reversal of the 
Chancery Court ruling might have an effect of a different magnitude than the Chancery Court 
ruling, and we test the assumption of equal magnitudes (but opposite sign) for the effects of the 
two events. To do so, we run a pooled OLS by regressing risk-adjusted one- and two-day 
announcement returns on a treated group indicator interacted with an indicator for the first event 
(Treated), a treated group indicator interacted with an indicator for the second event (De-
Treated), and an indicator for the second event (Event-2). We report the results of the estimation 
in Table III. Panel A of Table III reports specifications without 6-digit GICS industry fixed 
effects and Panel B reports specifications with such fixed effects. As before, all standard errors 
are clustered at the 6-digit GICS industry level.  
In Panels A and B of Table III, we find strong evidence consistent with the two rulings 
being associated with excess returns of similar magnitudes but in opposite signs. Focusing again 
on the two-day returns, Panel A of Table III indicates that, relative to non-treated firms, the 
excess returns to treated groups associated with the first ruling are positive in all six 
specifications, with statistical significance at the 5% level for five of these specifications; the 
excess two-day returns to treated groups associated with the second ruling are negative in all six 
specifications, with statistical significance at the 5% level for three; and, finally, for all six 
specifications, an F-test fails to reject at the 10% level the null hypothesis that the sum of the 
differences in average excess returns for the first and second rulings (Treated + De-Treated) is 
zero. The results in Panel B of Table III, which include industry fixed effects, are consistent with 
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the above results of Panel A. The excess two-day returns to treated groups associated with the 
first ruling are higher relative to non-treated firms for all six specifications, with statistical 
significance at the 5% level for five; the excess two-day returns to treated groups associated with 
the second ruling are lower relative to non-treated firms for all six specifications, with statistical 
significance at the 5% level for three; and, finally, in five of the six specifications, an F-tests fails 
to reject at the 5% level the null hypothesis that the sum of the differences in average excess 
returns for the first and second rulings (Treated + De-Treated) is zero.  
Overall, the results in this Section are consistent with the hypothesis that weakening the 
antitakeover force of staggered boards is viewed by market participants as value-enhancing. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, the Chancery Court ruling was accompanied by positive relative 
returns to the companies whose staggered boards were made less insulating by the ruling, and the 
Supreme Court ruling, which eliminated this effect, was accompanied by negative relative 
returns to these companies.   
We note again that any difference in returns between the treated and non-treated firms 
understates the market’s estimate of the value-reduction produced by the antitakeover force of 
staggered boards for two reasons. First, as discussed earlier, prior to each of the rulings, the 
market likely attached a nontrivial probability to the ruling. Second, permitting Airgas-type 
bylaws would have merely weakened rather than eliminated the antitakeover force of staggered 
boards. Thus, as was the case earlier, our results in this section provide an under-estimate of the 
cost that market participants estimate to be generated by board classification. 
 
4.4 Simulation Exercise 
We now turn to another way of testing whether the observed patterns, of positive relative 
returns to treated firms from the Chancery Court ruling and negative relative returns to treated 
firms from the Supreme Court ruling, were produced by random sampling variation rather than 
the rulings. To test for this hypothesis, we conduct a simulation exercise over all non-event days 
from the first half of 2010 -- that is, from January 2
nd
 to June 30
th
.  
In particular, for each pair of two-day windows in this period, we replicate the 
specifications in Panels A and B of Table II and Table III that use the Treated-III group indicator 
(reported in column (12)), and generate benchmark distributions of coefficients generated from 
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non-event days. We then consider whether the observed Treated coefficients in Table II, and 
coefficients of Treated and De-Treated and Table III, are abnormal when compared to the 
simulated benchmark distribution.   
To begin the exercise, we compute excess returns for each two-day window in a two-step 
procedure similar to that used in Tables II and III and in equations (1) and (2). First, we estimate 
each firm’s Fama-French three factor and UMD momentum factor loadings using returns data 
from 140 to 20 trading days prior; second, we take the residuals from a cross-sectional regression 
of two-day raw returns on the estimated factor sensitivities.  Once the two-day excess returns are 
generated for each day in the first half of 2010, we replicate the pooled regression results of 
Tables II and III using the Treated-III group indicator for each pair of two-day windows in the 
period.  
In particular, to replicate the specifications of Table II over non-event days, we multiply 
the returns from the latter of the two non-event days by negative one, and we regress the adjusted 
returns on the Treated-III group indicator and an indicator for the second event date. To replicate 
the specifications of Table III, we run a pooled OLS by regressing risk-adjusted two-day returns 
on the Treated-III group indicator interacted with an indicator for the first event (Treated-III), 
the Treated-III group indicator interacted with an indicator for the second event (De-Treated-III), 
and an indicator for the second event. 
Figure I displays the non-parametric Epanechnikov kernel density estimates of the 
simulated non-event Treated-III coefficients, generated following the constrained model of Table 
II. The dotted vertical line on each graph represents the location of our observed coefficients. We 
see from the figure that the simulated coefficients are approximately normally distributed and 
centered around 0. Moreover, our observed coefficients of 83.3 and 80.4 in the no fixed effects 
and fixed effects specifications of Table III are abnormally large when compared to the 
simulated distributions. Specifically, in Panel A of Table IV, which reports the univariate 
distributional summaries of the simulated coefficients, rows [1] and [2] indicate that our 
observed coefficients lie outside the 99
th
 percentiles of the distribution of simulated coefficients. 
In fact, only less than 0.5% of coefficients simulated based on the non-fixed-effects model in 
Panel A of Table III are larger than our observed coefficient of 83.3; and less than 0.2% of 
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coefficients simulated based on the fixed-effects model in Panel B of Table III are larger than our 
observed coefficient of 80.4.  
Figure II displays the non-parametric kernel bivariate density estimates of the simulated 
Treated and De-Treated coefficients, generated following the unconstrained model of Table III. 
The white arrow on each graph indicates the location of our observed pair of coefficients. As we 
see in Figure II and in rows [3]-[6] of Panel A of Table IV, the simulated coefficients are 
approximately bivariate normal and centered around (0,0). In comparison to this distribution, our 
observed Treated and  De-Treated coefficients – of 86.5 and -80.0 in the no fixed effects model 
and 95.4 and -71.0 in the fixed effects model of Table III – are abnormally large in magnitude.  
Table IV Panel B, which reports bivariate distributional summaries of the simulated 
Treated and De-Treated coefficients, shows that less than 0.1% of the simulated coefficients 
using the no-fixed-effects model are as large in magnitude (that is, having a Treated coefficient 
that is no smaller than the observed and a De-Treated coefficient that is no larger than the 
observed) as those of Table III Panel A. In the fixed effect model, less than 0.2% of the 
simulated coefficients using the fixed effects model are as extreme as those in Table III Panel B.  
In summary, our simulation results show that the treatment effects on the Treated-III 
group of firms observed in Tables II and III are highly unlikely to have arisen from random 
sampling variation. In each specification considered, we can reject the null hypothesis that the 
true mean treatment effects are 0 at the 0.5% or lower significance level.  
 
4.6. Different Meeting Date Cut-offs  
 In our primary empirical tests above, we defined treated firms on the basis of having a 
prior annual meeting date taking place in June or a later month in the calendar year. This 
threshold represents the upper half of the sample distribution and approximately represents the 
latter half of the year. In this section, we examine whether our results are robust to using 
different meeting month cutoffs and find that they are.  
To test robustness to using different meeting month cutoffs, we define nine versions of 
Treated-III. As before, the firms in the Treated-III group all have a staggered board and satisfy at 
least two of the four dimensions of firm or industry characteristics that make control contests 
especially relevant: underperformance, high asset pledgibility, small size, and high industry 
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takeover intensity. In contrast to before, where all Treated-III firms’ annual meetings took place 
in or after June in the calendar year, we now have versions with a different cut-off meeting 
month. In particular, the nine versions of the Treated-III group we consider below are based on 
different cut-off months from February through October.
32
  
 Our robustness tests employ the pooling specifications of Panels A and B of Table II, 
using two-day excess returns as dependent variables. Table V reports the excess returns of 
Treated-III (relative to non-Treated-III) firms based on the nine variations of the annual meeting 
month cutoffs. Panel A of this Table V does not include industry fixed effects, and Panel B of 
Table V includes such fixed effects.  
Both Panel A and Panel B of Table V display the same pattern: as we increase the cutoff 
month from February to October, the difference in the average two-day excess returns between 
Treated-III and non-Treated-III firms trends upwards; indeed, with the exceptions of August and 
October, the increase is monotonic. In the no-fixed effects specifications of Panel A, the Treated-
III coefficient grows from 35.1 basis points using a February cutoff to 83.3 basis points using a 
June cutoff to 84.7 basis points using an October cutoff. Consistent with this pattern, in the 
fixed-effects specifications of Panel B, the Treated-III coefficient grows from 34.7 basis points 
using a February cutoff to 80.4 basis points using a June cutoff to 88.7 basis points using an 
October cutoff.  
 In addition, Panel C of Table V reports a specification in which we regress the two-day 
risk-adjusted returns on a Treated-III indicator (but without the June cutoff requirement), the 
month of last annual meeting, an interaction of the treatment indicator with the month of last 
annual meeting, and an indicator for the second event date. In both the no-fixed-effects and 
fixed-effects specifications in Panel C, the interaction terms are positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. These results are consistent with the mean difference in 
announcement returns between treated and non-treated firms being larger in magnitude among 
those firms whose annual meeting took place later in the year.  
In summary, the patterns documented in Table V are consistent with the rulings (and the 
Airgas bylaw whose validity was at stake) having the greatest potential impact among firms that 
                                                 
32
 Using a cut-off meeting month of November or December leaves too few firms in the treated group to 
enable testing. 
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have annual meeting months later in the calendar year – that is, firms in which the Airgas bylaw 
could be used to significantly reduce the tenure of directors whose removal would be otherwise 
delayed by a staggered board. By showing that the magnitude of the identified effects in Table II 
increases as the cutoff month increases, these robustness tests reinforce our earlier conclusions 
concerning the Delaware Chancery and Supreme Court rulings’ effects. 
 
6. Conclusion  
This paper has sought to contribute to understanding the sources of the well-documented 
correlation between governance provisions insulating directors from removal, in particular 
staggered boards, and lower firm value. We have used a natural experiment – a recent Delaware 
Chancery Court ruling enabling shareholders to weaken the extent to which staggered boards 
insulate directors from removal and the subsequent reversal of this ruling by the Delaware 
Supreme Court – to identify how market participants in the aggregate view the effect of 
staggered boards on firm value. We find evidence consistent with market participants’ viewing 
staggered boards as bringing about a reduction in firm value.  
Our findings are consistent with the ongoing debate on staggered boards and the efforts 
of institutional investors to reduce the large number of companies that still have staggered 
boards. Our findings are consistent with policies adopted by many institutional investors in favor 
of proposals to de-stagger boards. Our findings are also consistent with the view that the ongoing 
process of dismantling staggered boards, encouraged by institutional investors, could be 
expected to contribute to increasing shareholder wealth. 
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Figure I 
 
Figure I displays the non-parametric Epanechnikov kernel density estimates of Treated-III coefficients (parallel to column 12 of 
Panels A and B of Table II), simulated over all unique pairs of days over the non-event window of January 2nd to June 30th of 
2010. Non-event coefficients are obtained as follows: for each pair of trading days, multiply the second event day’s two-day risk-
adjusted returns by negative one and regress these returns on the Treated-III  indicator, described in Section 4.1, and an indicator 
for the second event date. The left hand side (right hand side) figure plots the distribution of coefficients estimated based on the 
no-fixed-effects (fixed-effects) model of Panel A (Panel B) in Table II. The dashed vertical lines indicate the location of the 
observed corresponding coefficients in column (12) of Table II Panels A and B. 
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Figure II 
 
Figure I displays the non-parametric kernel bivariate density estimates of non-event Treated and De-Treated coefficients, simulated based on the no-fixed-effects and fixed-effects 
specifications in column (12) of Panels A and B in Table III, and simulated over all unique pairs of days over the non-event window of January 2nd to June 30th of 2010. Non-event 
coefficients are obtained as follows: for each pair of trading days, create Treated and De-Treated following Table III specifications and using the Treated-III group of firms, and 
regress risk-adjusted two-day returns on Treated, De-Treated, and an indicator for the second event date. The left hand side (right hand side) figure plots the bivariate distribution 
of coefficients estimated based on the no-fixed-effects (fixed-effects) model of Panel A (Panel B) in Table III. The arrow lines indicate the location of the observed corresponding 
coefficients in column (12) Table III Panels A and B. 
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Table I: Summary Statistics 
 
Table I reports summary statistics for the sample used in the paper, for firms with and without staggered boards and for all firms. 
Our base dataset comes from Shark Repellent, and consists of all U.S. based firms listed on NYSE, NYSE AMEX, NYSE 
ARCA, NASDAQ, or NASDAQ Capital Market, and excludes all dual-class firms, all real estate investment trusts (REITS, SIC 
= 6798), and all firms with insider equity ownership exceeding 50%. We obtain October and November stock returns from 
Datastream, historical returns from CRSP, and GICS and annual financial statement information from Compustat, resulting in a 
final sample of 2,633 observations. Meeting month is defined to be the month in which the last annual shareholders’ meeting took 
place; Ind-Adjusted PPE/Assets is defined to be the plant, property, and equipment to total assets ratio less the GICS6 industry 
median; Ind-Adjusted Cash/Assets is defined to be the cash to total assets  ratio less the GICS6 industry median; Ind-adjusted 
ROA is defined to be ROA less the GICS6 industry median, where ROA is defined as operating income divided by book value of 
assets from end of previous fiscal year; industry-adjusted Q is defined to be Tobin’s Q less the GICS6 industry median, where Q 
is defined as market value of assets divided by the book value of assets plus the market value of common stock less the sum of 
book value of common stock and balance sheet deferred taxes; market capitalization is taken from the most recently available 
annual financial statements; and takeover intensity is defined to be the proportion of firms in the GICS4 industry in calendar year 
2009 that were acquired.  
Panel A: Firms with a Staggered Board           
Variables Min Median Mean Max StdDev 
(N=1,240)           
Meeting Month 1 5 5.394 12 2.044 
Ind-Adjusted PPE/Assets -0.4229 0.0000 0.0146 0.4981 0.1306 
Ind-Adjusted Cash/Assets -3.9660 0.0332 -0.1518 2.0110 1.1191 
Ind-Adjusted ROA -0.6441 0.0072 0.0047 0.5190 0.1519 
Ind-Adjusted Tobin's Q -1.5310 0.0001 0.2478 4.9403 1.0436 
Market cap ($Mil) 1  504  1,958  80,453  4,693  
Takeover Intensity 0.0000 0.0443 0.0518 0.0954 0.0237 
 
Panel B: Firms without a Staggered Board           
Variables Min Median Mean Max StdDev 
(N=1,393)           
Meeting Month 1 5 5.6698 12 2.1707 
Ind-Adjusted PPE/Assets -0.4229 0.0000 0.0172 0.4981 0.1415 
Ind-Adjusted Cash/Assets -3.9660 0.0237 -0.1046 2.0110 1.0491 
Ind-Adjusted ROA -0.6441 0.0083 0.0080 0.5190 0.1589 
Ind-Adjusted Tobin's Q -1.5310 0.0080 0.2523 4.9403 1.0047 
Market cap ($Mil) 1 728 6,566 328,676 22,979 
Takeover Intensity 0.0000 0.0490 0.0506 0.0954 0.0231 
 
Panel C: All Firms           
Variables Min Median Mean Max StdDev 
(N=2,633)           
Meeting Month 1 5 5.540 12 2.116 
Ind-Adjusted PPE/Assets -0.4229 0.0000 0.0160 0.4981 0.1365 
Ind-Adjusted Cash/Assets -3.9660 0.0259 -0.1268 2.0110 1.0827 
Ind-Adjusted ROA -0.6441 0.0083 0.0080 0.5190 0.1589 
Ind-Adjusted Tobin's Q -1.5310 0.0044 0.2502 4.9403 1.0231 
Market cap ($Mil) 1 600 4,399 328,676 17,184 
Takeover Intensity 0.0000 0.0490 0.0512 0.0954 0.0234 
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Table II: Announcement Returns – Assuming Opposite Effects of the Two Events 
Table II reports results from pooled OLS regressions, pooling the October 8th and the November 23rd rulings returns, of one- and two-day risk-adjusted ruling announcement returns on a treated group 
indicator variable and an indicator variable for the second event date (Event 2). We make the assumption that the treatment effects are of the same in magnitude for the two events but opposite in sign, 
and multiply risk-adjusted returns on the second event date by -1. Risk-adjusted returns are computed in two steps as follows. First, each firm’s loadings on the Fama-French (1993) three factors and 
the Fama-French (1996) UMD momentum factor are estimated using the most recently available 120 trading days’ data ending on or prior to June 30th of 2010. Second, risk-adjusted announcement 
window returns are obtained by taking the residuals from a cross-sectional regression of raw announcement window returns on the estimated factor sensitivities. Panel B (Panel A) reports results 
estimated with (without) 6-digit GICS industry fixed effects. Columns (1)-(12) differ based on whether one-day or two-day risk-adjusted announcement returns are used as the dependent variable, or 
based on which treated group indicator, described in Section 4.1, is used as the dependent variable. Cluster robust standard errors, clustered at the 6-digit GICS level, appear immediately below the 
coefficient estimate in parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by ┼, *, **, and *** for 15%, 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
Panel A: No Industry Fixed Effects  
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
  Treated-I   Treated-II-up   Treated-II-pl   Treated-II-sm   Treated-II-ti   Treated-III 
  1-Day 2-Day   1-Day 2-Day   1-Day 2-Day   1-Day 2-Day   1-Day 2-Day   1-Day 2-Day 
Treated 7.231 48.307***   22.948┼ 89.398***   9.516  55.800***   20.526  75.961***   1.702  38.404**   19.952  83.259*** 
  (10.04) (14.83)   (14.33) (23.11)   (10.26) (17.31)   (15.87) (27.09)   (9.71) (15.75)   (14.82) (25.96) 
Event 2 2.683 -2.823   2.682 -2.824   2.683 -2.823   2.682 -2.823   2.683 -2.822   2.682 -2.824 
  (14.72) (18.22)   (14.72) (18.22)   (14.72) (18.22)   (14.72) (18.22)   (14.72) (18.22)   (14.72) (18.22) 
Cons -6.074 -8.463   -7.274 -10.048   -6.208 -8.341   -6.766 -7.715   -5.139 -4.974   -6.806 -8.735 
  (9.32) (13.47)   (9.05) (13.10)   (9.42) (13.43)   (9.15) (13.35)   (9.29) (13.88)   (9.13) (13.32) 
Observations 5,265 5,265   5,265 5,265   5,265 5,265   5,265 5,265   5,265 5,265   5,265 5,265 
Adj. Rsq 0.000 0.002   0.000 0.005   0.000 0.002   0.000 0.003   0.000 0.001   0.000 0.004 
 
Panel B: Industry Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
  Treated-I   Treated-II-up   Treated-II-pl   Treated-II-sm   Treated-II-ti   Treated-III 
  1-Day 2-Day   1-Day 2-Day   1-Day 2-Day   1-Day 2-Day   1-Day 2-Day   1-Day 2-Day 
Treated 10.466 44.506***   26.693* 87.522***   12.365  49.282***   27.782* 75.232***   6.625  30.099*   25.314* 80.439*** 
  (10.77) (15.81)   (14.39) (23.54)   (10.80) (17.91)   (16.12) (27.39)   (9.62) (15.25)   (14.74) (26.12) 
Event 2 2.686 -2.809   2.686 -2.809   2.686 -2.809   2.686 -2.808   2.687 -2.808   2.686 -2.809 
  (14.82) (18.34)   (14.82) (18.34)   (14.82) (18.34)   (14.82) (18.34)   (14.82) (18.34)   (14.82) (18.34) 
Cons -6.572 -7.887   -7.653 -9.867   -6.582 -7.497   -7.404 -7.659   -5.643 -4.133   -7.303 -8.482 
  (7.17) (8.89)   (7.08) (8.65)   (7.30) (8.96)   (7.16) (8.86)   (7.38) (9.44)   (7.15) (8.81) 
Observations 5,265 5,265   5,265 5,265   5,265 5,265   5,265 5,265   5,265 5,265   5,265 5,265 
Adj. Rsq 0.004 0.005   0.004 0.007   0.004 0.005   0.004 0.006   0.003 0.003   0.004 0.006 
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Table III: Announcement Returns – Allowing for Differential Magnitudes 
 
Table III reports results from pooled OLS regressions, pooling the October 8th and the November 23rd rulings returns, where we allow for the possibility that the two DE court rulings may be 
accompanied by relative returns of different magnitudes. We define treated groups for the first event (Treated) and the second event (De-treated), where the Treated group indicators are created by 
interacting the treated group variables of Table II (and described in Section 4.1) with an indicator for the first event date, and the De-Treated indicators are created by interacting the treated group 
variables of Table II with an indicator for the second event date. Panels A and B regress one- and two-day risk-adjusted announcement returns on the Treated and De-Treated indicators as well as an 
indicator for the second event date (Event 2), where Panel B (Panel A) reports results estimated with (without) 6-digit GICS industry fixed effects and risk-adjusted returns are computed as described 
in Table II. Columns (1)-(12) differ based on whether one-day or two-day risk-adjusted announcement returns are used as the dependent variable, or based on which treated group indicator, described 
in Section 4.1, is used as the dependent variable. Cluster robust standard errors, clustered at the 6-digit GICS level, appear immediately below the coefficient estimate in parentheses. Levels of 
significance are indicated by ┼, *, **, and *** for 15%, 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: No Industry Fixed Effects  
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
  Treated-I   Treated-II-up   Treated-II-pl   Treated-II-sm   Treated-II-ti   Treated-III 
  1-Day 2-Day   1-Day 2-Day   1-Day 2-Day   1-Day 2-Day   1-Day 2-Day   1-Day 2-Day 
Treated 28.768┼ 73.206***   32.493 97.572***   33.440┼ 87.494***   29.899 79.136**   10.097 41.658┼   27.568 86.506**  
  (18.67) (24.15)   (22.81) (35.71)   (20.58) (28.94)   (26.48) (39.44)   (20.28) (25.40)   (24.00) (37.54) 
De-Treated 14.307 -23.406   -13.403 -81.224***   14.410 -24.104   -11.153 -72.785***   6.692 -35.149   -12.336 -80.012*** 
  (12.64) (21.45)   (14.89) (26.57)   (14.41) (23.76)   (17.64) (26.74)   (18.64) (30.36)   (15.72) (27.84) 
Event 2 9.464 19.747   11.866  22.920┼   9.732 19.504   10.848 18.253   7.594 12.771   10.929 20.293 
  (11.30) (15.28)   (10.81) (14.38)   (11.37) (15.11)   (10.89) (14.84)   (10.76) (15.13)   (10.96) (14.67) 
Cons -9.379 -12.283   (8.235) (10.871)   -9.334 -12.482   -7.588 -7.994   -5.996 -5.307   -7.509 -9.034 
  (9.42) (13.12)   (9.32) (13.35)   (9.46) (13.06)   (9.35) (13.54)   (9.25) (13.73)   (9.26) (13.60) 
Observations 5,265 5,265   5,265 5,265   5,265 5,265   5,265 5,265   5,265 5,265   5,265 5,265 
F-Stat 3.027 2.055   0.550 0.146   2.722 2.503   0.345 0.025   0.247 0.020   0.302 0.025 
P-Val 0.087 0.156   0.461 0.703   0.104 0.118   0.559 0.875   0.621 0.889   0.584 0.874 
Adj. Rsq 0.000 0.002   0.000 0.005   0.000 0.003   0.000 0.003   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 
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Table III: Announcement Returns -- Allowing for Differential Magnitudes (Cont’d) 
 
Table III reports results from pooled OLS regressions, pooling the October 8th and the November 23rd rulings returns, where we allow for the possibility that the two DE court rulings may be 
accompanied by relative returns of different magnitudes. We define treated groups for the first event (Treated) and the second event (De-treated), where the Treated group indicators are created by 
interacting the treated group variables of Table II (and described in Section 4.1) with an indicator for the first event date, and the De-Treated indicators are created by interacting the treated group 
variables of Table II with an indicator for the second event date. Panels A and B regress one- and two-day risk-adjusted announcement returns on the Treated and De-Treated indicators as well as an 
indicator for the second event date (Event 2), where Panel B (Panel A) reports results estimated with (without) 6-digit GICS industry fixed effects and risk-adjusted returns are computed as described 
in Table II. Columns (1)-(12) differ based on whether one-day or two-day risk-adjusted announcement returns are used as the dependent variable, or based on which treated group indicator, described 
in Section 4.1, is used as the dependent variable. Cluster robust standard errors, clustered at the 6-digit GICS level, appear immediately below the coefficient estimate in parentheses. Levels of 
significance are indicated by ┼, *, **, and *** for 15%, 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel B: Industry Fixed Effects  
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
  Treated-I   Treated-II-up   Treated-II-pl   Treated-II-sm   Treated-II-ti   Treated-III 
  1-Day 2-Day   1-Day 2-Day   1-Day 2-Day   1-Day 2-Day   1-Day 2-Day   1-Day 2-Day 
Treated 26.663
┼ 71.643***   33.832┼ 102.228***   34.222* 87.664***   32.738 82.727*     20.957 47.070**   36.467┼ 95.436**  
  (16.90) (23.25)   (22.28) (36.42)   (18.92) (28.22)   (27.00) (41.69)   (15.19) (18.65)   (24.50) (40.04) 
De-Treated 12.192 -24.968   -12.073 -76.568***   15.183 -23.934   -8.323 -69.194**    17.544 -29.737   -3.446 -71.082**  
  (12.08) (20.17)   (15.44) (26.83)   (12.54) (21.68)   (18.75) (26.62)   (14.57) (27.35)   (15.92) (27.19) 
Event 2 9.474 19.747   11.876  22.920┼   9.741 19.503   10.858 18.253   7.602 12.77   10.938 20.293 
  (11.37) (15.38)   (10.88) (14.48)   (11.44) (15.21)   (10.95) (14.93)   (10.82) (15.23)   (11.02) (14.76) 
Cons -9.060┼ -12.043┼   -8.374┼ -11.340┼   -9.440┼ -12.504┼   -7.841 -8.309   -7.11 -5.86   -8.335 -9.859 
  (6.09) (7.72)   (5.74) (7.55)   (6.28) (7.86)   (5.73) (7.73)   (5.75) (7.52)   (5.79) (7.83) 
Observations 5,265 5,265   5,265 5,265   5,265 5,265   5,265 5,265   5,265 5,265   5,265 5,265 
F-Stat 3.316 2.169   0.742 0.341   4.041 3.082   0.522 0.095   2.942 0.253   1.333 0.303 
P-Val 0.073 0.146   0.392 0.561   0.048 0.084   0.472 0.758   0.091 0.616   0.252 0.584 
Adj. Rsq 0.016 0.013   0.016 0.016   0.016 0.014   0.015 0.014   0.015 0.011   0.000 0.000 
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Table IV: Simulations 
 
Table IV reports summary statistics on the empirical distribution of OLS coefficients generated from estimating the specifications of Tables II and III 
(based on Treated-III group of firms) over all unique pairs of days over the non-event window of January 2nd to June 30th of 2010. Panel A reports 
univariate distributional summary statistics of the coefficients simulated based on Tables II and III specifications. Rows [1] and [2] of Panel A 
summarize the distribution of simulated Treated-III coefficients for the no-fixed-effects and fixed-effects specifications in Panels A and B of Table 
II, respectively. Rows [3], [4], and rows [5], [6] summarize the distribution of the Treated and De-Treated coefficients simulated based on the no-
fixed-effects and fixed-effects specifications in Panels A and B of Table III, respectively. Panel B reports bivariate distributional summaries for the 
Treated and De-Treated coefficients. In particular, Panel B reports the proportion of the simulated coefficients that fall in specified ranges. For 
example, the (1,1)th cell in the No-Fixed-Effects panel of Panel B reports that 0.08% of the simulated pairs of Treated and De-Treated coefficients 
have a Treated coefficient that is less than or equal to -80 basis points and a De-Treated coefficient that is less than or equal to -80 basis points.  
 
 Panel A: Univariate Distributional Summary  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  1st Pctile Median Mean 99th Pctile StdDev 
 
[1] Treated-III (No FE) -63.03 2.86 3.95 73.53 29.76 
            
 
[2] Treated-III (FE) -56.19 2.45 2.87 66.47 26.35 
            
 
[3] Treated (No FE) -100.58 7.06 6.69 109.40 42.42 
[4] De-Treated (No FE) -102.36 4.03 -1.19 83.97 41.75 
            
 
[5] Treated (FE) -82.64 5.79 7.00 109.06 41.13 
[6] De-Treated (FE) -86.68 1.02 -0.77 88.44 38.23 
 
 
Panel B: Bivariate Distributional Summary  
  No Fixed Treated 
  Effects (-inf,-80] (-80,86] (86,inf) 
D
e-
T
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a
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d
 
(-inf,-80] 0.08% 3.49% 0.09% 
(-80,86] 2.75% 90.44% 2.17% 
(86,inf) 0.01% 0.95% 0.01% 
  Fixed Treated 
  Effects (-inf,-71] (-71,95] (95,inf) 
D
e
-
T
re
a
te
d
 
(-inf,-71] 0.00% 2.28% 0.15% 
(-71,95] 2.48% 92.59% 2.11% 
(95,inf) 0.03% 0.37% 0.00% 
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Table V: Robustness Test – Different Meeting Month Cutoffs 
 
Table V reports a robustness test for the pooling specification presented in Table II column (12). In Panels A and B, each column differs based on the meeting 
month cutoff used to define treated groups. For example, Treated in column (1) is defined to be those with staggered boards, whose last annual meeting took 
place on or after the month of February, and have at least two of the four dimensions of firm or industry characteristics which make control contests particularly 
relevant: underperformance, high asset pledgibility, small size, and high industry takeover intensity. In Panel B we include 6-digit GICS industry fixed effects 
but not in Panel A. In all specifications we use cluster robust standard errors, clustered at the 6-digit GICS level, which appear immediately below the coefficient 
estimate in parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by 
┼
, *, **, and *** for 15%, 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: No Industry Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  Month > Feb Month > Mar Month > Apr Month > May Month > Jun Month > Jul Month > Aug Month > Sep Month > Oct 
Treated 35.117** 39.816*** 40.141*** 47.590*** 83.259*** 101.430*** 85.678** 108.913* 84.686┼ 
  (15.35) (14.70) (14.69) (16.39) (25.96) (34.47) (41.30) (57.06) (57.19) 
Event 2 -2.824 -2.824 -2.824 (2.824) -2.824 (2.822) -2.821 (2.821) -2.821 
  (18.22) (18.22) (18.22) (18.22) (18.22) (18.22) (18.22) (18.22) (18.22) 
Cons -9.053 -9.882 -9.771 -10.305 -8.735 -4.479 -3.264 -3.078 -2.209 
  (13.96) (13.78) (13.81) (14.12) (13.32) (13.33) (13.71) (13.71) (13.64) 
Observations 5,265 5,265 5,265 5,265 5,265 5,265 5,265 5,265 5,265 
Adj. Rsq 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 
Panel B: Industry Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  Month > Feb Month > Mar Month > Apr Month > May Month > Jun Month > Jul Month > Aug Month > Sep Month > Oct 
Treated 34.667** 39.427** 39.852** 44.770*** 80.439*** 100.763*** 85.084** 108.491* 88.673┼ 
  (15.75) (15.24) (15.14) (16.80) (26.12) (34.84) (42.53) (57.60) (55.04) 
Event 2 -2.810 -2.810 -2.810 (2.810) -2.809 (2.806) -2.806 (2.806) -2.806 
  (18.34) (18.34) (18.34) (18.34) (18.34) (18.34) (18.34) (18.34) (18.34) 
Cons -8.957 -9.803 -9.715 -9.763 -8.482 -4.464 -3.256 -3.077 -2.271 
  (9.80) (9.47) (9.51) (9.79) (8.81) (8.93) (9.36) (9.37) (9.22) 
Observations 5,265 5,265 5,265 5,265 5,265 5,265 5,265 5,265 5,265 
Adj. Rsq 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 
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Table V: Robustness Test – Different Meeting Month Cutoffs (Cont’d) 
 
Table V reports a robustness test for the pooling specification presented in Table II column (12). Panel C reports OLS estimation results from regressing two-day 
risk-adjusted returns on an adjusted Treated-III indicator, the month of last annual meeting, an interaction of the Treated-III indicator with month of last annual 
meeting, and an indicator for the second event date (Event 2). We adjust the definition of Treated-III group of firms by removing from the definition a firm’s last 
annual meeting month: a firm is in the Treated-III group of firms if it has a staggered board and have at least two of the four dimensions of firm or industry 
characteristics which make control contests particularly relevant: underperformance, high asset pledgibility, small size, and high industry takeover intensity. In 
both specifications we use cluster robust standard errors, clustered at the 6-digit GICS level, which appear immediately below the coefficient estimate in 
parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by 
┼
, *, **, and *** for 15%, 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
             Panel C: Interaction Model 
  (1) (2) 
  Treated-III Treated-III 
Treated X Month 16.372** 17.314**  
  (7.21) (6.95) 
Month -38.319 -41.989 
  (35.14) (35.34) 
Treated 3.033 1.887 
  (2.43) (2.83) 
Event 2 -3.973 -3.959 
  (18.20) (18.32) 
Cons -22.407 -17.349 
  (16.03) (14.88) 
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes 
Observations 5,243 5,243 
Adj. Rsq 0.003 0.006 
 
